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1. Introduction 
 
Recursion is a central issue of the biolinguistic investigation of language. This 
special issue brings together seven new contributions on recursion from several 
different perspectives: theoretical syntax, neurolinguistics, language acquisition, 
genetics, and psycholinguistics. In this introduction, we first briefly characterize 
the background on recursion that the contributions share and that led to this 
special issue of Biolinguistics. Secondly, we situate the advances of the individual 
contributions in this issue against the background of studies on recursion. 
 The notion of recursion has played a significant role in the development of 
the field of linguistics and specifically of the generative approach. The concern 
that lead to recursion is very old: Descartes (2003 [1637]: 38) hypothesized that 
the crucial difference between man and animal manifests itself most clearly in the 
fact that an animal “never […] arranges its speech in various ways […] in order 
to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the 
lowest type of man can do”. In a similar vein, and two centuries later, Wilhelm 
von Humboldt (1999 [1836]: 91) pointed out the human capacity to “make infinite 
employment of finite means” in language. Recursive rules provide one solution 
to the problem of accounting for an infinite number of possible sentences by 
means of a finite memory space. However, Descartes and Humboldt didn’t yet 
talk about recursion specifically, and infinity could be produced by means other 
than recursion. In the 1950s, Noam Chomsky developed formal language theory 
as a mathematically precise model of language and, using it, specified a precise 
role of recursion within formal models of language. In fact, recursion in one 
specific way proved to be essential to set apart the phrase structure models of 
language Chomsky proposed from the behaviorist models of language prevalent 	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at the time. Chomsky, however, didn’t use the term recursion for this notion, but 
defined the notion of self-embedding as follows: 
 
(1) A language L is self-embedding (s.e.) if it contains an A 
 such that for some φ, ψ (φ ≠ I ≠ ψ), A ⇒ φAψ.       (Chomsky 1959: 148) 
 
The definition characterizes as self-embedding any language that contains a 
string A and allows the derivation from A of a string that properly contains A, 
that is, A is preceded and followed by two non-trivial strings. Over two papers, 
(Chomsky 1956, 1959) showed that the concept of self-embedding precisely sets 
apart context-free grammars from less complex models of grammar (specifically, 
finite state Markov process based models): All and only the languages produced 
by a context-free grammar that are self-embedding cannot be given an analysis 
using the less complex models. 
 Chomsky (1957) furthermore showed that English is self-embedding. In a 
nutshell, this demonstration consists of the observation that patterns such as (2) 
exist in English (slightly modified from Chomsky 1957: 22) and clearly satisfy the 
definition of self-embedding in (1). 
 
(2)  a. S ⇒ If S, then it’s true. 
 b. S ⇒ Either S or not. 
 
Finite state Markov chain models of language cannot capture the long-distance 
dependencies between if and then and either and or. Therefore, Chomsky 
established that behaviorist accounts of language were insufficient, whereas the 
phrase structure grammars Chomsky introduced could be sufficient. In this way, 
recursion was crucial for the development of phrase structure based approaches 
to language. However, subsequently recursion was not a major topic: Once 
phrase structures were established, recursion became part of the background. 
Chomsky and many other linguists proceeded to develop concrete phrase 
structure based grammars for specific languages. 
 Almost ten years ago, recursion became an active topic of research again 
due to work of Marc Hauser, Noam Chomsky, and Tecumseh Fitch. In an influ-
ential paper, Hauser et al. (2002) formulate a new hypothesis involving recursion. 
For this purpose, they differentiate between the broad and the narrow sense of 
faculty of language, drawing on the basic biolinguistic distinction between 
human traits that can be relegated to more general cognitive capacities, which, as 
Hauser et al. claim, are shared with other animals, and traits that are both human- 
and language-specific. They then hypothesize that only syntactic recursion 
belongs to the faculty of language in the narrow sense. With syntactic recursion, 
Hauser et al. seem to have in mind a general ability that underlies Chomsky’s 
(1959) notion of self-embedding language in (1): a property of languages that dis-
tinguishes between phrase structure grammars and less powerful grammars (cf. 
Fitch 2010, Tomalin 2011, Luuk & Luuk 2011). Specifically, Hauser et al. write that 
“[n]atural languages go beyond purely local structure by including a capacity for 
recursive embedding of phrases within phrases” (p. 1577). Recursion is more 
general than self-embedding, though: The natural numbers, for example, also 
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rely on recursion, though possibly recursion within a finite-state grammar. Fol-
lowing much of the subsequent psychological literature (e.g. Gentner et al. 2006, 
Friederici et al. 2006), we assume that only a grammar that can account for self-
embedding languages should be called recursive, and will use the term in this 
restricted sense in the following. 
 The hypothesis of Hauser et al. and their arguments captured the imagi-
nation of many researchers from different disciplines. Even though an enormous 
amount of progress has been made, many of the debates Hauser et al. triggered 
are still not resolved. This special issue takes up three major concerns that have 
developed since 2002. The first concern is how to test for recursion in experi-
mental psychology: Since we cannot test humans on infinite sets of sentences and 
furthermore self-embedding in the sense of (1) is difficult for humans to process, 
how can recursion best be tested for? The second major concern is the role of re-
cursion in linguistic theory: Is recursion an integral part of any syntactic structure 
building or is recursion better viewed as something on top of more basic struc-
ture building? Finally, the third major concern this issue addresses is the relation 
of recursion to the genetic and neural basis of language. Can recursion be sepa-
rated from other parts of language in the genetic and neural domain? 
 
2. Testing Recursion in Experimental Psychology 
 
Testing recursion in experimental psychology crucially rests on the Artificial 
Grammar Learning (AGL) paradigm, which goes back to Reber (1967) and 
enables psychologists to isolate fundamental mechanisms involved in natural 
language syntax in sophisticated test designs. The first AGL study interpreted to 
be relevant for understanding syntactic recursion at the behavioral level was 
carried out by Fitch & Hauser (2004). They focused on the comparison between a 
self-embedding language and one that isn’t. The two types of structures can be 
illustrated with the two English sentences in (3) and (4): 
 
(3) [The man]A [the dog]A [bit]B [comes]B. 
 
(4) [The man]A [comes]B; [the dog]A [bit the man]B. 
 
As already mentioned, a finite-state grammar cannot account for center-
embedded languages. Fitch & Hauser created stimuli that correspond to the 
artificial grammar AnBn, generating structures like (3) with n=2, and (AB)n, 
yielding for n=2 structures like (4). The actual stimuli were not created using 
English words, however, but classes of syllables. With these stimuli, Fitch & 
Hauser compared the parsing abilities of cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) 
and humans regarding both grammar types. The result of their study was “that 
tamarins suffer from a specific and fundamental computational limitation on 
their ability to spontaneously recognize or remember hierarchically organized 
acoustic structures” (p. 380). That is, while tamarins were able to process struct-
ures generated by the (AB)n grammar, they were not capable of mastering 
structures according to the AnBn formula. Accordingly, this experimental study 
supports the hypothesis that “the acquisition of hierarchical processing ability 
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may have represented a critical juncture in the evolution of the human language 
faculty” (p. 380) and thus may be of direct relevance to the hypothesis suggested 
by Hauser et al. (2002). 
 However, a finite set of experimental materials such as that of Fitch & 
Hauser couldn’t in principle exclude all alternative explanations other than a 
recursive phrase structure grammar of the performance of the human subjects. 
For the materials of Fitch & Hauser, specifically, humans may have relied on 
counting rather than grammar building when processing the AnBn sequences or 
on additional cues specific to their stimuli. Research since has explored different 
experimental methods and formal grammars to more precisely pin down specific 
human abilities. One focus has been the fact that natural human language 
requires the ability to process sequences in which a consistent coupling of AB-
pairs is involved (cf. Perruchet & Rey 2005, de Vries et al. 2008). To visualize, the 
more exact representation of our sentence (3), according to this objection, must be 
(5), where the pairing of particular As an Bs is marked by numbers: 
 
(5) [The man]A1 [the dog]A2 [bit]B2 [comes]B1. 
 
The results for formal grammars eliciting such structures have been mixed. Given 
several methodological issues, it is now a central concern in this field of inquiry 
“that the relation between artificial language studies and natural language must 
be clarified” (Hauser et al. 2007: 127). As a consequence, experimental methods 
and insights have become more differentiated. Two contributions in this issue, 
one by de Vries et al. and one by Poletiek, advance this agenda. 
 Meinou de Vries, Morten H. Christiansen, and Karl Magnus Petersson 
argue that research focusing only on nested dependencies like (3) cannot provide 
us with a complete picture of where the boundaries of human language process-
sing lie. They show that crossed dependencies, another type of non-adjacent 
dependencies, are easier to learn than nested dependencies, if the number of 
dependencies exceeds two. In light of this finding, they argue that the different 
complexity levels formulated in the Chomsky hierarchy (cf. Chomsky 1956) and 
used by studies such as Fitch & Hauser (2004) and Gentner et al. (2006) are less 
relevant. Instead, they propose a new complexity hierarchy, which is based on 
the assumption that syntactic complexity is determined by (i) the number of de-
pendencies that need to be resolved and (ii) the specific ordering of these 
dependencies. 
 Fenna Poletiek argues that the so-called ‘staged input effect’ is relevant for 
learning an artificial grammar with center-embedded structures. Referring to 
studies that have shown that artificial grammars with center-embedded 
structures are difficult to learn by induction, Poletiek claims that participants do 
better if the input used to train human subjects is presented in an incremental 
organization, starting with the least complex and ending with the most complex 
exemplars. Crucially, this staged input effect is argued to be helpful for 
hierarchical structures only and shows no effect for learning a finite state 
grammar. Like de Vries et al., Poletiek advances the perspective that competence 
models for language complexity like the Chomsky hierarchy should care about 
performance factors such as learnability. 
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3. Locating Recursion in Linguistic Theory 
 
Syntactic theories describe generalizations at various levels of the typology of 
phrases. At the least specific level of the phrasal typology, any word or phrase 
belongs to the same type. All that can be said for this type of phrase is that two 
phrases can form a complex syntactic constituent, as is captured by the operation 
Merge in minimalist syntax. Many syntactic generalizations, however, make refer-
ence to a more articulated typology of phrases. For example, a generalization 
across several languages is that single words (heads) are distinguished from com-
plete phrases for word order phenomena: Languages can therefore be described 
as either head-initial (e.g. English) or head-final (e.g. Japanese). This supports a 
typology of phrases that distinguishes between heads (single words) and maxi-
mal projections (complete phrases). A second distinction between types of 
phrases is important within minimalist syntax: the distinction between phases 
and non-phases. Phases are special phrases that are distinct from other phrases 
by their intonational and semantic properties. 
 The debate over the appropriate typology of phrases does not directly 
relate to the formal notion of self-embedding as characterized in (1), since the 
formal notion applies to languages — not to concrete grammars. However, there 
exists also a natural notion of recursion that applies to specific structures in a 
phrase structure based syntax: A structure is recursive if there is a phrase of type 
X that contains as a proper part another phrase of type X. Recursion of a concrete 
phrase structure grammar is evidently a different notion from self-embedding as 
defined in (1). The link between the notions is the following: If a language is self-
embedding, any phrase structure grammar must be such that some strings are 
analyzed as having a recursive structure. But, importantly, the notion of self-
embedding never predicts which specific strings must receive a recursive anal-
ysis, nor is any language that can be analyzed with phrase-structure grammar 
that allows some recursive structures necessarily self-embedding in the formal 
sense. 
 The notion of recursive structure is nevertheless an important one, 
especially since for natural language other sources of evidence (for example, into-
national and semantic evidence) are available to determine the phrase structure 
of a specific sentence. Which structures are recursive, however, is closely tied the 
typology of phrases. As already mentioned, current minimalist syntax assumes 
an abstract operation Merge as the only phrase structure rule. Merge always 
structures exactly two items into one phrase. Therefore, any sentence consisting 
of three or more words must involve a recursive operation of phrase structure 
building on this view, as Nevins et al. (2009) point out. But if the typology of 
phrases assumed is richer, a smaller set of structures are analyzed as recursive. 
For example, the traditional phrase structure rules S ⇒ NP V and NP ⇒ D N 
allow the analysis of the sequence D N V without recursion. Moreover, some 
scholars committed to more ‘strong’ derivational approaches like phase theory or 
other models implying multiple points of Spell-Out have recently argued that the 
narrow structure-building operations of grammar are not recursive at all and that 
recursion might better be described as an interface phenomenon (cf. Arsenijević 
& Hinzen 2010, Surányi 2010). 
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 Jan-Wouter Zwart assumes a minimalist background and claims that 
syntactic recursion should not be defined in terms of embedding, but in terms of 
derivation layering. Comparing iterative and recursive procedures to build 
phrase structures, he argues that one cannot decide that a language is recursive 
by simply looking at its structures. Instead, one has to investigate the structure 
building procedure itself. After showing that embedding structures can also be 
generated without recursion, Zwart defines recursion in language as the 
interaction between derivation layers. He then applies these concepts to the 
analysis of the Amazonian language Pirahã. Everett (2005) claims that Pirahã 
does not exhibit recursion which has led to intense discussion on the relevance of 
this finding with respect to the status of recursion as a linguistic universal. 
According to Zwart’s approach, both complex subjects and structured lexical 
items imply recursion. Zwart then demonstrates, using uncontested data, that 
both complex subjects and structured lexical items are attested in Pirahã, and 
thus, he argues that the grammar of Pirahã allows for recursive structures. 
 Tom Roeper starts with the assumption that if variation is attested 
regarding what particular forms of recursion natural languages allow, then an 
acquisition challenge exists. In the light of acquisition evidence from adjectives, 
possessives, verbal compounds, and sentence complements, he outlines an 
acquisition path for specific forms of recursion. In particular, he distinguishes 
three mechanisms to build recursive structures: direct recursion, indirect 
recursion, and Generalized Transformations (GTs), as realized in an adaptation 
of Tree Adjoining Grammar. Since children first analyze adjacent identical struc-
tures as direct recursion with a conjunctive reading, Roeper argues that direct 
recursion is the acquisition default and can thus be viewed as the first stage in the 
acquisition of recursive structures. Assuming that children must ‘experience’ 
specific forms of recursion in order to allow them in their language, he goes on to 
discuss several evidences that may help account for the path of how to acquire 
the more complex forms of both indirect recursion and recursion in the form of 
GTs. 
 
4. Localizing Recursion in Cognitive Neuroscience and Genetics 
 
The testing of human and non-human subjects regarding their capacities to pro- 
cess artificial language grammars inspired neuropsychological studies that ask to 
what extent the core computational faculty of processing hierarchical embedded 
structure can be segregated from other brain functions. Let us briefly look at this 
field of research. 
 Friederici et al. (2006) build on the findings of Fitch & Hauser (2004) and 
hence assume that humans differ from non-human primates in their capacity to 
master sequences that are generated by the AnBn grammar. In their study, they 
ask, broadly speaking, whether the differences of processing the two grammars 
used by Fitch & Hauser are reflected in the human brain. To explore this 
question, they test human subjects by visually presenting sequences of 
consonant-vowel syllables that were modeled to represent the different grammar 
types. After having used these stimuli and after having applied several 
sophisticated testing procedures, they indeed conclude that there are differences 
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in processing in the brain. In particular, Friederici et al. report that processing of 
local transitions within a finite-state grammar is subserved by the left frontal 
operculum, whereas a specific section of Broca’s area holds responsible for the 
computation of hierarchical dependencies involved in syntactic recursion within 
a phrase structure grammar. However, like in experimental psychology, the 
testing methods have been refined in subsequent studies, which is the starting 
point for three contributions in the present volume. 
 Angela D. Friederici, Jörg Bahlmann, Roland Friedrich, and Michiru 
Makuuchi report such refinements by reviewing recent neuroimaging experi-
ments that evaluate the neural basis of processing embedded structures, which, 
as they argue, allows for conclusions regarding the localization of processing re-
cursion in the brain. Based on numerous studies, they conclude that a special 
region of Broca’s area, left Brodmann area 44, is the neural correlate of computing 
linguistic recursion. They segregated this correlate from activation of Broca’s area 
due to working memory, from activation due to the processing of visual-event 
sequences, and from areas involved in processing hierarchically structured 
mathematical formulae. Friederici et al.’s cross-study review thus suggests two 
different computational systems in the lateral prefrontal cortex dealing with hier-
archical structures, one which is domain-general and is active when processing 
complex hierarchies in non-language domains, and one which is domain-specific 
and deals with recursive language or language-like hierarchies. 
 Vasiliki Folia, Christian Forkstam, Martin Ingvar, Peter Hagoort, and 
Karl Magnus Petersson compare the brain networks engaged in processing 
grammaticality judgments and in processing preference judgments in an artificial 
grammar learning experiment. Their results show that preference and gram-
maticality classification engage virtually identical brain regions. That is, the 
subjects also engage brain regions central to natural syntax processing when they 
are not explicitly instructed or receive any information concerning the existence 
of a grammatical rule system that underlies the presented stimuli. In addition, 
Folia et al. present some initial efforts to understand the genetic basis of the capa-
city for artificial syntax acquisition by exploring the potential role of the CNT-
NAP2 gene, which is controlled by the FOXP2 transcription factor and whose 
expression is enriched in frontal brain regions in humans. 
 Eleonora Russo and Alessandro Treves ask what evolutionary changes 
have occurred in the human neocortex that allow for the crucial feature of 
recursion in human language. After having reviewed salient features of cortical 
organization, they discuss recent work that shows that the human cortex has 
more neurons (in absolute number) than any other mammal, or, more 
specifically, that the number of spines present on the dendrites of pyramidal cells 
are significantly higher in the human cortex than in any other species. They then 
argue that these quantitative differences can produce qualitative changes in the 
functionality of a neural network. Discussing the phenomenon of latching 
dynamics, that is, the ‘hopping’ of the network from one attractor state to 
another, they refer to their previous analyses of this phenomenon and sketch the 
boundary between finite and infinite latching. In particular, they claim that a 
network latches indefinitely when the memory load is above a certain critical 
value. By assuming that latching is a property that emerges when crossing 
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certain threshold, they suggest the evolutionary scenario that recursion in human 
language has evolved due to a slowly evolving quantitative increase in the 
connectivity of the cortex that has suddenly crossed a critical threshold. 
Accordingly, syntactic recursion may have emerged in a manner entirely 
unrelated to the appearance of a novel piece in the neural circuitry, that is, 
without altering the intrinsic make-up of the network. 
 
In addition to the seven research papers, a book review by David J. Lobina is 
included in this volume. Lobina reviews the recently published volume Recursion 
and Human Language, edited by Harry van der Hulst. We feel the review should 
be read in addition to the editorial to elaborate further the background for the 
research presented in this volume. 
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